Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.
Introduction
The network structure of social interactions in ‡uences a variety of behaviors and economic outcomes, including the formation of opinions, decisions on which products to buy, investment in education, access to jobs, and informal borrowing and lending.
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine the requirement that individuals do not bene…t from altering the structure of the network. An example of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion de…ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A network is pairwise stable if no individual bene…ts from severing one of her links and no two individuals bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly. Pairwise stability is a myopic de…nition. Individuals are not farsighted in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Indeed, the adding or severing of one link might lead to subsequent addition or severing of another link. If individuals foresee how others react to changes in the network, then one wants to allow for this in the de…nition of the stability concept. For instance, individuals might not add a link that appears valuable to them given the current network, as that might induce the formation of other links, ultimately leading to lower payo¤s for the original individuals.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have proposed the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks that predicts which networks one might expect to emerge in the long run when individuals are farsighted.
1 A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g 2 G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse o¤ or equally well o¤, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, 2 and (iii) if there is no proper 1 Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Chwe (1994) , Xue (1998) , Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2004) , Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) , Page, Wooders and Kamat (2005) , Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005) , and Page and Wooders (2009) . 2 A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network. Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network.
subset of G satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) This second condition implies that a pairwise farsightedly stable network is robust to perturbations. 3 When a pairwise farsightedly stable network g exists, it is the unique one, it is pairwise stable, it belongs to the largest pairwise consistent set (see Chwe, 1994) , and the set fgg coincides with the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set and the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set (see Chwe, 1994) . Note that the notion of farsightedness has the ‡avor of a focal point notion. Compared to other stable networks, players realize that all of them could be better o¤ by establishing a farsighted stable network (if it exists), although creating it might require the formation of links that do not immediately bene…t the two agents connected by it. So farsighted stability could be viewed as a coordination device. This focal point property is of course reinforced by the uniqueness of the pairwise farsighted stable network.
There is a subtle connection between notions of pairwise stability (PWS) and farsighted stability (FS). In particular, a FS network is always PWS, but not the other way round. Hence, FS can be viewed as a re…nement of PWS. But the un-3 There are some random dynamic models of network formation that are based on incentives to form links such as Watts (2002) , Jackson and Watts (2002) , and Tercieux and Vannetelosch (2006) .
These models aim to use the random process to select from the set of pairwise stable networks.
derlying behavioral assumptions of both notions -myopia versus farsightednessare at odds with each other. In our paper we test these types of behaviors in the context of network formation. Network formation is hard to study in the …eld, as many potentially con ‡icting factors are at work. Consequently, we run laboratory experiments. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the …rst experimental test of farsightedness versus myopia in network formation.
In the experiment, groups of four subjects had to form a network. More speci…-cally, they were allowed sequentially to add or sever one link at a time: a link was chosen at random and the agents involved in the link had to decide if they wanted to form it (if it had not been formed yet) or to sever it (if it had been already formed).
The process was repeated until all group members declared they were satis…ed with the existing network. The payo¤s were designed such that a group consisting of myopic agents would never form any link, while a group composed of farsighted agents would form the complete network which was of course FS. The results supported FS and strongly rejected the hypothesis of myopic behavior both at the group and at the individual level. More than 70% of the subjects were farsighted and a similar percentage of the experienced groups reached the FS network, while only 8% of the sample displayed behaviors consistent with myopia.
The number of experiments addressing networks and network formation is rapidly increasing. 4 Relatively few of them, however, deal with pure network formation, intended as a setting where no strategic interactions take place on the network once it has been formed. Among the notable exceptions stand the experiments of Goeree, Riedl and Ule (2009) and Falk and Kosfeld (2003) . They investigate the predictive power of a strict Nash network in the framework of Bala and Goyal (2000) . They …nd low support for this concept when the Nash network is asymmetric and the agents homogeneous. The main di¤erence with our design is that they consider a model with unilateral link formation and apply non-cooperative solution concepts, while in our context of bilateral link formation those concepts provide implausible predictions (see Bloch and Jackson, 2006) .
Closer to our approach is the work of Pantz and Ziegelmeyer (2008) , where R&D networks in a Cournot oligopoly are investigated. Their results generally support pairwise stability. In their design pairwise stable networks are also farsightedly stable and thus there is no tension between myopia and farsightedness.
5
The only experiment on network formation that addresses in some way farsightedness, to the best of our knowledge, is the one by Berninghaus, Ehrhart and Ott (2008) . The authors argue they …nd evidence of a kind of limited farsightedness, which they use to build the concept of one-step-ahead stability. Relevant features distinguish our work from their model: (i) they assume unilateral link formation;
(ii) players play a coordination game on the endogenously formed network and thus the assumption on the beliefs about this latter game a¤ects the predictions; (iii) the farsightedness notion they consider relates speci…cally to the interaction between the linking strategies and the strategies in the coordination game. So their experiment combines a test of network formation and strategic behavior in the coordination game, while our paper is the …rst to directly investigate farsightedness and myopia in a network formation context una¤ected by any other considerations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the necessary notation and de…nitions. Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures.
Section 4 reports the experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
Networks: notation and de…nitions
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the …nite set of players who are connected in some network relationship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links indicate bilateral relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij 2 g to indicate that i and j are linked under the network g. Let g N be the collection of all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so g N is the complete network. The set of all possible networks or graphs on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of g N .
The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and the network that results from deleting link ij from an existing network g is denoted g ij.
5 They observe huge di¤erences between the case in which the Cournot pro…ts are considered as exogenously given and identi…ed with the payo¤s of the players in the network, and the case in which players play the production stage after forming the network. This supports pure network formation as the cleanest setting to study network formation.
The material payo¤s associated to a network are represented by a function x :
G ! R n where x i (g) represents the material payo¤ that player i obtains in network g. The overall bene…t net of costs that a player enjoys from a network g is modeled by means of a utility function u i (g) : R n ! R that associates a value to the vector of material payo¤s associated to network g . This might include all sorts of costs, bene…ts, and externalities. Given a permutation of players and any g 2 G, let
Thus, g is a network that is identical to g up to a permutation of the players. We say that the function of material payo¤s satisfy anonymity if, for every g 2 G and permutation ,
ensures that the labels of the agents do not matter.
Let N i (g) = fj j ij 2 gg be the set of nodes that i is linked to in network g. The degree of a node is the number of links that involve that node. Thus node i's degree in
with k 2 f0; 1; :::; n 1g.
The degree distribution of a network g is a description of the relative frequencies of nodes that have di¤erent degrees. That is, P (k) is the fraction of nodes that have degree k under a degree distribution P ; that is P (k) = (#S k (g)) =n. Given a degree distribution, P , we de…ne a class of networks as C P = fg 2 G j P (k) = P (k); 8kg.
A class of networks is the subset of G with the same degree distribution.
Consider a network formation process under which mutual consent is needed to form a link and link deletion is unilateral. A network is pairwise stable if no player bene…ts from severing one of their links and no other two players bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly.
Formally, a network g is pairwise stable if
and
We say that g 0 is adjacent to g if
with at least one inequality holding strictly.
Pairwise stability is equivalent to the statement of not being defeated by another (adjacent) network.
Agents are assumed to consider only their own incentives when making their linking choices and not that of the others. In particular, agents do not take into account the likely chain of reactions that follow an action, but only its immediate pro…tability. Thus, PWS implicitly assumes myopic behavior on the part of the agents.
We now de…ne myopic behavior. At time t the link ij is selected, the action of agent i is a t i 2 f0; 1g, where 0 means not to form (to break) the selected link ij, and 1 means to form (to keep) the link ij.
0 otherwise,
1 otherwise.
Myopic behavior only looks at the pro…tability of adjacent networks.
We now de…ne farsighted behavior. Farsightedness captures the idea that agents will consider the chain of reactions that could follow when deviating from the current network, and evaluate the pro…tability of such deviation with reference to the …nal network of the chain of reactions. As a consequence, a farsighted agent will eventually choose against her immediate interest if she believes that the sequence of reactions that will follow her action could make her better o¤.
A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network. Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. We now introduce the formal de…nition of a farsighted improving path.
De…nition 2. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g 0 6 = g is a …nite sequence of graphs g 1 ; : : : ; g K with g 1 = g and g K = g 0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g either:
If there exists a farsighted improving path from g to g 0 , then we write g ! g 0 .
For a given network g, let
This is the set of networks that can be reached by a farsighted improving path from g. Based on this notion of farsighted improving path, we de…ne a network g to be pairwise farsightedly stable (FS) if there is no farsighted improving path leaving g and there exists a farsighted improving path from any other network leading to g. Formally,
De…nition 3. A network g 2 G is pairwise farsightedly stable (FS) if:
, and
Although the existence of a FS network is not guaranteed in general, the notion of FS network has very nice properties as a predictive device for our experiment.
Indeed, when a FS network exists, it is the unique one (since F (g) = ; contradicts condition (ii) in order to have another network g 00 6 = g being also FS) and it is pairwise stable (due to the fact that F (g) = ;). We are then restricting the analysis to situations where farsightedness re…nes pairwise stability. Moreover, if a FS network exists, it is consistent with other set-based notions of farsighted stability that have been proposed in the literature. In particular, in case of existence the FS network coincides with the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set 6 (see Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch, 2009 ) and the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set (see Chwe, 1994) . 7 It is also contained by the largest pairwise consistent set (see Chwe, 1994) . and (ii). 7 The set G G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set if (i) there is no farsighted improving path connecting any two networks in G and (ii) there is a farsighted improving path from any network outside G to a network in G. Corollary 4 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) asserts that the set fgg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. Then, when a FS network exists, it coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. 8 A set G is a pairwise consistent set if both external and internal pairwise deviations are deterred. The largest pairwise consisten set is the set that contains any pairwise consistent set.
De…ning farsighted behavior requires that every agent is farsighted and that this is common knowledge. But when a farsighted agent observes a non-farsighted play of another agent, we do not know exactly the kind of action the farsighted agent will choose. Her action will depend, among others, on her beliefs about the others' degree of farsightedness. A complete theoretical analysis of farsighted behavior with heterogeneous agents goes far beyond the purpose of this paper. To de…ne farsighted behavior for the purpose of this paper, note that a general pattern of farsighted behavior can be easily identi…ed. A farsighted agent should move towards the FS network while believing it is reachable, and only change her strategy once convinced that the best feasible stable solution is not the FS network.
Though the details of this heuristics must be adapted to the speci…c case, the features that characterize it as farsighted are invariant. Its structure will consist of the following elements: (i) at the beginning of the game a farsighted agent will act as if everybody else is farsighted; (ii) given her (evolving) beliefs on her group composition she will assess if there is a feasible path that goes to the FS network;
(iii) if at some t the group is not on this path she will target a di¤erent stable network. In Section 4 we will specify such a heuristics more in detail in order to estimate the portion of farsighted experimental subjects.
3 Experimental design and procedures
The game
We consider a simple dynamic link formation game, almost identical to that proposed by Watts (2001) . Time is a countable in…nite set: T = 0; 1; :::; t; :::; g t denotes the network that exists at the end of period t. The process starts at t = 0 with n = 4 unconnected players (g 0 coincides with the empty network, g ; ). The players meet over time and have the opportunity to form links with each other.
At every stage t > 0, a link ij t is randomly identi…ed to be updated. At t = 1 each link from the set g N is selected with uniform probability. At every t > 1, a link ij from the set g N n ij t 1 is selected with uniform probability. Thus, a link cannot be selected twice in two consecutive stages. If the link ij 2 g t 1 , then both i and j can decide unilaterally to sever the link; if the link ij = 2 g t 1 , then i and j can form the link ij if they both agree. g t 1 is updated accordingly and we move to g t . All group members are informed about both the decisions taken by the players involved in the selected link and the consequences on that link. They are informed through a graphical representation of the current network g t and the associated payo¤s. After every stage all group members are asked whether they are satis…ed with the current network or not. If they unanimously declare they are satis…ed, the game ends; otherwise, they move to the next stage. 9 To ensure that an end is reached, a random stopping rule is added after stage 25: at every t 26 the game ends anyway with probability 0.2.
The game is repeated three times to allow for learning: groups are kept the same throughout the experiment. Group members are identi…ed through a capital letter (A, B, C or D). The identities are reassigned at every new repetition.
A vector of payo¤s is associated to every network: it allocates a number of points to each player in the network. The subjects receive points depending only on the …nal network of each repetition. Thus, their total points are given by the sum of the points achieved in the …nal networks of the three repetitions. At the end of the experiment the points are converted into Euro at the exchange rate of 1 Euro = 6
points.
The subjects are informed about the payo¤s associated to every possible network and know the whole structure of the game from the beginning. Before starting the …rst repetition the participants have the opportunity of practicing the relation between networks and payo¤s and the functioning of the stages through a training stage and three trial stages.
Predictions
Since n = 4, it follows that #g N = 6 and #G = 64. representation is su¢ cient to assign a payo¤ to each player in each possible network con…guration. These numbers were chosen in order to provide the resulting predictions with a set of nice properties that are described below. is needed in order to change the prediction for myopic agents. In both cases, these sequences of events are highly unlikely, and our prediction for a myopic group of 10 Pairwise Nash stability is a re…nement of both pairwise stability and Nash stability, where one requires that a network be immune to the formation of a new link by any two agents, and the deletion of any number of links by any individual agent. 11 In this last case, the players in the group may add the remaining links and end in g N .
players is to end up in g ; .
To identify the FS network, we need to compute F (g) for every g. We can prove the following result.
Proposition 1. Consider payo¤s as in Figure 1 and a set N of four self-regarding
The proof of this proposition, as well as all other proofs, can be found in Appendix A.
Using the de…nition of a FS network we derive the following corollary:
Corollary 1. g N is the unique farsightedly stable network.
Hence, a group composed by farsighted agents will end up at g N . This prediction is robust to errors in the sense that the farsighted prediction does not depend on the starting point: from any other network g 6 = g N , there is a farsighted improving path leading to g N . Moreover, since F (g N ) = ;, farsighted agents will stay at g N once it is reached. Remember that the FS network is also PWS. Even myopic agents will stay at the FS network once it is reached. Therefore, one cannot …nd direct experimental evidence against PWS as opposed to FS. But our experiment discriminates between the di¤erent behavioral models that lie behind both stability concepts. In this way our experiment can provide evidence in favor or against the farsighted models of network formation in cases where they re…ne PWS.
The payo¤s guarantee that the predicted networks are unique, both for the myopic and the farsighted behavior, and disjoint. Moreover, the predicted networks are not strongly e¢ cient in the sense of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) 12 nor Pareto dominant. Previous experimental studies have shown that e¢ ciency considerations can drive individual's behavior (see Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) . But e¢ ciency arguments could not explain if g N or g ; were observed in the experiment.
Up to now we have considered self-regarding agents. However, many experimental results show that subjects do not only care about their own payo¤s, but also about the payo¤s of the other agents (for an overview, see Sobel, 2005) . Our predictions also hold for social preferences. As an example, take the inequity model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and assume that all agents are equally motivated by
inequity aversion. Let x = x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n be the vector of monetary payo¤s. The utility function of player i is given by
with and 0 1.
Proposition 2. For the network formation game with inequity averse agents, it holds that (i) myopic agents will remain in the empty network, g ; , and (ii) farsighted agents will build the complete network, g N , for every and 0 1.
Experimental procedures
The experiment took place at the EELAB of the University of Milan-Bicocca on June 10th and 11th, 2010. The computerized program was developed using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . We run 6 sessions with 24 subjects per session, for a total of 144 participants and 36 groups. Participants were undergraduate students from various disciplines, 13 recruited through an announcement on the EELAB website.
Subjects were randomly assigned to individual terminals and were not allowed to communicate during the experiment. Instructions were read aloud (see Appendix C for an English translation of the instructions). Participants were asked to …ll in a control questionnaire; the experiment started only when all the subjects had correctly completed the task.
Sessions took on average 90 minutes, including instructions, control and …nal questionnaire phases. Average payment was 16.10 Euro (no show up fee was paid) with a minimum of 4.70 and a maximum of 22.70 Euro.
Results
We start by considering groups'…nal networks. Table 1 classi…es groups with respect to their …nal network in each repetition (period). In the …rst period around 40% of the groups reached g N . This percentage increased to 70% in the second and third period. Less than 20% of the groups were consistent with the myopic prediction in the last two periods. 14 So a huge majority of the groups formed the FS network.
We also …nd evidence of learning: the portion of groups that displayed out-ofequilibrium behavior (category "None") decreased to around 10% of the sample in the last period. This result is rather striking since the categories "Myopic" and "Farsighted" consisted of one speci…c network each, while the residual category "None" covered 62 networks. We use the Pearson's chi-square and the Likelihood Ratio test to determine whether the relative frequencies of myopic and farsighted di¤er or not in the di¤erent periods. While in period 1 there is no signi…cant di¤erence between numbers of myopic and farsighted groups, in period 2 and 3 the di¤erences are signi…cant at the 0.01 level (see Table 1 ). Table 2 replicates 1 without taking into account those groups that played for more than 25 stages in one period. This is done in order to exclude groups that played when the random stopping rule was in place, as it is di¢ cult to assess the stability of the …nal network in those cases. Typically, the excluded groups either did not end up in a stable network when they where stopped by the random stopping rule (Category "None" in Table 1 ). Or they were stopped while being in the empty network ("Myopic" in Table 1 ). In the last kind of groups, there is somebody refusing to declare himself "satis…ed", though the group has been in g ; for many stages without moving.
14 Except for one group in one single period, every other group moves from the empty network.
As a consequence we gather indirect evidence about the behavior of groups that do not start from a PWS network.
The results are qualitatively similar when comparing Tables 3 and 4 report the change in the outcome of individual groups from Period 1 to 2 and from Period 2 to 3, respectively. For example, take the row "Farsighted"
of Table 3 . It shows that among the groups who reached the FS network in period 1, only 7 % switched to the empty, myopic network in period 2, whereas 93 % of the groups also reached the FS network in period 2. But among those groups who ended up in the empty network in period 1, only 20% stayed at the empty network in period 2, whereas 50 % switched to the FS network, and 30% to an unstable network.
Similarly, among the groups who ended up in some other network in period 1, 55%
of them switched to the FS network in period 2, while only 18% of them switched to the empty network. for up to 90% of the observations.
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We now turn to individual behavior. While myopic behavior is well de…ned and provides a clear-cut prediction at every decision node, farsighted behavior depends on the agents beliefs about others which in turns depend on the past play. We will use as a proxy a decision rule of the kind discussed in Section 2. We have tested for many di¤erent alternative de…nitions and the results have proved to be highly stable among all of them. The results of these robustness checks are shown in Appendix
B.
An agent is attributed to be farsighted if she uses the following decision rule: (iv) if an absolute majority is not present, the individual is Not classi…ed.
Step (ii) is necessary if one wants to consider only the choices that can be clearly identi…ed:
the Ambiguous class is not a proper category as it collects choices that cannot be classi…ed. Table 5 : Individuals: relative frequencies of subjects consistent with each category, per period and on aggregate
We implement this procedure for each single period and on the whole vector of individual choices. The corresponding results are shown in Table 5 . We are able to classify from around 71% of the participants in the …rst period to around 89% in the third. Aggregate results show that only 1% of the subjects behave systematically against both myopia and farsighted prescriptions. Only 8% of the individuals behave myopically, whereas three quarters of them are consistent with farsightedness. The di¤erence is huge and it holds across all the three periods. We …nd evidence of individual learning: the fraction of farsighted agents increases steadily, while the fraction of myopic agents decreases from the …rst to the second period and increases in the last. 17 An alternative way would be to retain those choices and classify individuals according to relative majority. The results of this procedure are qualitatively identical to the ones reported. Table 6 : Average group compositions Table 6 shows how the composition of groups in ‡uences the observed outcome.
Take as an example the column "Myopic". On average groups reaching the Myopic network consist of 1.32 myopic individuals, 1.36 farsighted ones, 0.41 individuals whose behavior is not consistent with either myopic or farsighted behavior, and 0.91 subjects that cannot be classi…ed. Groups that reached the FS network consist on average of 3.51 farsighted individuals, and of a negligible number (0.06) of myopic ones. These patterns of group composition indicate that: (i) more than three players are needed to reach the complete network for sure; (ii) slightly more than one myopic agent is su¢ cient to make the group consistent with the myopic prediction; (iii) more mixed groups have a higher chance of being stuck somewhere in between.
The presence of a small number of myopic agents was able to drive the results of a signi…cant fraction of groups. Moreover, the presence of farsighted agents in myopic groups accounts for the fact that only one group remained in the empty network from the beginning. Summing up:
Result 2. Individual behavior strongly rejects myopia for a vast majority of the subjects; 3 out of 4 participants are found consistent with farsightedness. One myopic participant can be su¢ cient to enforce a myopic outcome for the entire group.
Conclusion
This paper reports an experimental test of the behavioral assumptions underlying the most used stability notions for network formation. In particular we test whether subjects behave myopically or farsightedly when forming a network. As far as we know this is the …rst experimental investigation into this issue.
Our results strongly reject the hypothesis of myopic behavior both at the group and at the individual level. Behaviors consistent with farsightedness account for 75% of the individual observations. Consequently, about 60% of the groups reach the farsighted stable network in the …rst repetition. This share increases to 70% as the game is repeated, and of those groups that stopped before stage 25 even 83%
reached the farsighted stable network in the last period.
A conservative account of our results suggests that farsighted stability is a valuable re…nement concept when among the pairwise stable networks there are farsightedly stable ones. However, the behavioral model underlying pairwise stability is strongly rejected. This opens the way to new interesting research questions, in particular related to those cases where farsighted stability provides predictions that are not pairwise stable.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To avoid reporting the farsighted improving path for each single network, let g i be a generic network in class C i and c i C i a generic
proper subset of the corresponding class. We will write g i ! g; g 2 C j and g i ! g; g 2 c j , when the generic network g i in class C i reaches with a farsighted improving path all the networks in class C j or only a proper subset c j of C j , respectively. The list of farsighted improving paths among the networks in G is the following:
It follows that g N 2 F (g), for all g in G n g N and F (g N ) = ;, which corresponds to our de…nition of FS network. We know that this network is the unique FS network.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Result (i) derives from the notion of pairwise stability.
We know that g ; is pairwise stable if = 0 and = 0. To simplify notation, let
x ik be the monetary payo¤ of player i in network g k and u ik the corresponding utility.
It is immediate to note that u ik x ik for any g k . Now, u ik = x ik ; 8i, for every and 0 1 if g k = g ; . Thus, it follows from the de…nition that g ; is pairwise stable for every and 0 1. Since the experiment starts at g ; , myopic agents will not move.
(ii) For result (ii), recall the de…nition of farsighted improving paths and of far-sightedly stable network.
We know that g N is the unique farsightedly stable network if = 0 and = 0 (i.e., when u ik = x ik ; 8i, 8g k ). Now, for every and 0 1, we have that u ik x ik , 8i, 8g k , and
Thus, if g ! g N for some and , then g ! g N for every 0 and 0 .
Hence, since g N 2 F (g) for any g 2 G n g N for = = 0, we also have that g N 2 F (g) for any g 2 G n g N for every and 0 1.
There is no immediate way to show analytically that F (g N ) = ; for every and 0 1, whenever F (g N ) = ; for = = 0. However we can prove it numerically for our payo¤s, simulating the resulting utilities and corresponding farsighted improving paths for the set of admissible parameters.
B Other de…nitions of farsighted behavior
We present here the robustness check for di¤erent proxies of farsighted behavior. As discussed in Section 3, there are three parameters in the farsighted decision rule that can be manipulated: (i) when the turning point may occur (up to which stage one tries to build links); (ii) why it may occur: which is the reference class of networks; (iii) what behavior to take: try to get back to the 'safe'empty network or behave myopically. 
C Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. In this experiment you can earn money. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions you and other participants make. Please read these instructions carefully. In the experiment you will earn points. At the end of the experiment we will convert the points you have earned into euros according to the rate: 6 points equal 1 Euro. You will be paid your earnings privately and con…dentially after the experiment. Throughout the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants in any way. If you have a question please raise your hand. One of us will come to your desk to answer it.
Groups
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly assign youand all other participants -to a group of 4 participants. Group compositions do not change during the experiment. Hence, you will be in the same group with the same people throughout the experiment.
The composition of your group is anonymous. You will not get to know the identities of the other people in your group, neither during the experiment nor after the experiment. The other people in your group will also not get to know your identity.
Each participant in the group will be assigned a letter, A, B, C, or D, that will identify him. On your computer screen, you will be marked 'YOU'as well as with your identifying letter (A, B, C or D). You will be marked with your identifying letter (A, B, C or D) on the computer screens of the other people in your group.
Those identifying letters will be kept …xed within the same round, but will be randomly reassigned at the beginning of every new round.
Length and articulation of the experiment
The experiment consists of 3 rounds, each divided into stages.
The number of stages in each round will depend on the decisions you and the other people in your group make.
After a round ends, the following will start, with the same rules as the previous:
actions taken in one round do not a¤ect the subsequent rounds.
General rules: rounds, stages, formation and break of links In each round the task is to form and break links with other members of the group.
You will have the possibility to link with any other participant in your group.
That is, you can end up with any number of links (0, 1, 2 or 3).
Thus, the number of links that can be formed in your group will be a number between 0 and 6 (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The set of links that exist in your group at the same time is called a network.
Your group starts the …rst stage of every round with zero links.
In every stage a network of links is formed, based on your and the other group participants decisions. This network is called the current network.
Your group will enter a new stage with the links that exist in the network that is formed in the previous stage, according to the following linking rules
Stage rules
In each stage the computer will select for each group a single link among the six possible at random. A link cannot be selected twice in two consecutive stages.
The participants involved in that link will be asked to take a decision in that stage, the others will be informed about the selected link and will be asked to wait for others'decisions.
If this link does not exist at the beginning of the stage, the decision will be whether to form that link or not. If this link exists at the beginning of the stage, the decision will be whether to keep or to break that link.
Thus, in each stage at most one link can be formed or broken.
Stopping rules
After every stage you and the other people in your group will be asked if the current network is satisfactory to you. You can answer YES or NO.
If ALL the people in your group answer YES the round ends and the points associated to the current network are considered to compute your earnings.
If at least one person in your group answers NO, the group moves to the next stage.
After stage 25 a random stopping rule is added. In this case, even if you or any of the other people in your group are not satis…ed with the current network, the round will end with probability 0.2.
Earnings
To every participant in every network is associated a number of points.
You will receive points according to the network that exists in your group at the end of each round.
Your total earnings will be the sum of the earnings in each of the 3 rounds.
Thus, the points associated to the networks you and the other people in your group form at every stage, except for the last of each round, are not considered for the computation of your earnings.
You are always informed about the points associated to the current network on screen. On the top of your screen, you are always informed of the points you earned in the previous rounds.
You can learn about the points associated to every other network through the points sheet you …nd attached to the instructions. It displays the points associated to every class of networks:
-In every network, the black dots are the participants in the group; the lines are the existing links.
-Every class of network is characterized by the number of links each participant has.
-The numbers close to every black dots indicate the number of points a person with that number of links is earning in that speci…c class of networks.
An example will clarify the relation between network and points and the developing of the experiment. You will also practice through a training stage.
Concluding remarks
You have reached the end of the instructions. It is important that you understand them. If anything is unclear to you or if you have questions, please raise your hand. To ensure that you understood the instructions we ask you to answer a few control questions. After everyone has answered these control questions correctly the experiment will start.
Control questionnaire
This questionnaire is intended to verify that everybody have understood the instructions. You will not be evaluated according to the answers you give. Once you complete the questionnaire, please, raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you to check your answers. In the following we will write ab to denote the link between participants A and B (and so on).
1. Network 1 includes the links ac and bc. Network 2 includes the links ac, ad, bd, and cd. Please draw both networks and …ll in with the corresponding points for each participant. 
